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Abstract— This paper presents an overview of research being
conducted on Personal Networking Solutions within the Mobile
VCE Personal Distributed Environment Work Area. In par-
ticular it attempts to highlight areas of commonality with the
MAGNET initiative. These areas include trust of foreign devices
and service providers, dynamic real-time service negotiation to
permit context-aware service delivery, an automated controller
algorithm for wireless ad hoc networks, and routing protocols for
ad hoc networking environments. Where possible references are
provided to Mobile VCE publications to enable further reading.
I. INTRODUCTION
Personal Networking [1] is an evolving area based on the
interconnection of a range of user devices to form a user-
based network. The devices themselves can be interconnected
over existing network infrastructure such as cellular technolo-
gies, DSL, WLAN, or short range ad hoc networks such as
Bluetooth. Thus, Personal Networks (PNs) exist at a level of
abstraction above existing networks. The solution proposed
within the Mobile VCE Personal Distributed Environment
(PDE) work area is based on application layer networking [2].
That is, applications of the constituent devices communicate
with each other and are lower level protocol agnostic.
Like other Personal Networking initiatives, it is assumed
that the user has a range of wireless devices forming a Personal
Area Network (PAN). The PDE will exist against a backdrop
of a wirelessly interconnected service environment. A range of
wireless devices will inhabit the environment and can provide
the PAN with a multitude of services. These service will be
many and varied and include additional user interfaces; the
PAN could make use of public available screen or keyboard
devices. A range of bearer services may become available as
the PAN enters hot-spot areas. A wide range of teleservice
could also be supported: issue of electronic travel tickets and
other context-aware services.
Although it is recognised that the PAN is an essential ele-
ment of PNs, the requirement for local, context-aware service
provision to that PAN should not be allowed to obscure the
need for more traditional telecoms services to be supported by
the PN. Thus, communication with remote locations/providers
must be factored into the solution. Where this approach
is adopted the concept of one user subnetwork (wired or
wireless) having precedence over another is no longer relevant:
the user will have access to a range of subnetworks but there
will be no core subnetwork. Instead the core is a user proxy
resident on service provider infrastructure.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section
II presents an overview of the PDE Personal Networking
architecture and the need for a core entity. Section III presents
an overview of the Digital Marketplace (DMP) concept: a
mechanism to permit real-time negotiation for bearer and
teleservice provision to PNs across heterogeneous radio access
providers. Provision of context-aware service to PNs depends
in large part on the user’s location, as the user moves around
his/her environment he/she may encounter a range of new
devices, access network providers, and localised teleservice
providers; determining the degree of trust to assign to these
entities is considered in Section IV. Section V provides a
brief overview of other security challenges being investigated
for PNs. Section VI examines routing issues within ad hoc
networking environments. Finally, conclusions and directions
for future work are presented in Section VII.
II. THE PDE CORE & SIP
The central entity in the PDE is a controlling entity that
manages session set-up to the various user devices; this entity
is known as the Device Management Entity (DME)1. The
DME is the first point of contact for all remote session set-up
requests to the user. The DME is based on a user-based SIP
server [3]; all remote incoming session requests are sent to the
DME via a single user-based URI. The DME them determines
the most suitable user device to handle the request based upon
its proximity to the user and the characteristics and capabilities
of the device.
Within each of the subnetworks resides a local controller
to manage the devices therein and to facilitate session set-
up to constituent devices. The local control functionality may
potentially reside on any one of the devices in a subnet-
work, assuming that the device has the capability to act as
a host. In order to be a suitable host, a device must have
sufficient available memory and processing ability to support
that functionality. Another important attribute of a host, in
a wireless/mobile subnetwork, is residual battery power; it is
necessary that the host can support the controller functionality
for a sustained period of time. Since battery power will
1The Device Management Entity in this architecture is not related to that
defined as part of 802.15.3.
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Fig. 1. PDE Subnetworks
decline with time, it may be necessary to periodically change
the host such that the wireless subnetwork always has an
active controller. Thus, a change of host becomes a distinct
possibility. It is well accepted that battery power is a significant
constraining factor in the operation of PANs. Battery power
will deteriorate with time, and the rate of consumption will
depend on many factors including processor usage. When a
device is chosen as a host for the local controller there will be
an associated overhead in terms of processor usage and hence
power consumption. Any algorithm concerned with host deter-
mination must take into account the residual battery power of
that device. Furthermore, the algorithm must take into account
measurement error associated with battery power estimation.
Estimates of remaining battery life are prone to fluctuations
that vary with time since their projections are based on short
term historical measurement of power consumption. Thus, a
short but intense period of power consumption may produce
a significant though transitory reduction in projected battery
life.
Within the Mobile VCE research programme, an algorithm
for intelligent and dynamic host identification is being under-
taken.
III. THE DIGITAL MARKETPLACE
In order to allow the concept of the PN to grow beyond
the PAN, we require a system whereby a user’s devices can
access whatever access network can most effectively provide
connectivity in that location. Traditional solutions involving a
single operator which ‘owns’ the user, supported by roaming
agreements to foreign networks, are not satisfactory. They are
inherently unscaleable, and are not well suitable to highly
homogeneous network technologies where connectivity may
be provided by one of many different wireless or wired
technologies.
One system which does provide a scalable, user-focussed
solution to the problem of establishing possibly short term
connections over different network types is the Digital Mar-
ketplace [4]. The digital marketplace (DMP) provides an
environment facilitating real-time bearer negotiation across
heterogeneous access networks. Within the marketplace are
three main types of entities, each implemented as software
agents. Network Operator Agents (NOA) represent each net-
work which can provide connectivity to users within the area
served by the DMP. Service Provider Agents (SPA) are created
within the market to represent users who require service
within the DMP area. This assumes that users would have
a relationship with a service provider to manage their service
package and provide billing, etc. In fact, this need not be the
case and with suitable payment schemes and depending on the
DMP policies, users could create their own agents to negotiate
on their behalf. Such agents would act in a similar manner to
SPAs. Finally, the DMP has a number of agents – Market
Provider Agents (MPAs) which provide support and security
functions for negotiations and market operation.
The basic system of DMP operation is as follows. When a
user wishes to make a call or connect to a service, they contact
their Service Provider through the Logical Market Channel
(LMC). The LMC operates as a random access channel and
will be implemented in all the access technologies provided
by Network Operators in that particular DMP. Physically
provided by one or more of the network operators, the LMC is
contracted by the DMP, so a user may use an LMC provided
by one operator to access the DMP, whereupon they will
eventually negotiate to use another operator to provide the
service. The first operator would still be paid by the DMP for
the use of the LMC.
Once contacted by the user, the service provider will activate
a SPA in the DMP, which will then invite bids from the NOAs
to provide the service. The negotiating strategy could be as
simple a choosing the lowest price, or may offer the option of
choosing different quality options. For example, an MP3 may
be available at a range of price levels, but also at a range of
sampling frequencies. Thus, a quality-cost trade-off analysis
is required.
If the user wants to be able to receive calls some form of
paging arrangement has to be set up. In the DMP this is done
by the SPA negotiating for a registration and paging contract,
whereby the user will be managed by the contracted network,
with location updates and paging done through that network.
If the user only makes outgoing calls (as would be likely in
the case of a data user), the registration and paging contract,
and its associated cost, is not required.
To take into account the statistical nature of a wireless
interface, the contract includes the concept of commitment,
which is the degree of confidence that the network will
be able to fulfill the contract on its original terms through
to its conclusion. In addition, both NOA and SPA have a
reputation, which represents the confidence that they will fulfill
agreements (such as, for example, the specified commitment).
Reputations are built up over a number of transactions and are
controlled by the MPAs. Full details of DMP operation can
be found in [4].
The DMP has a number of advantages. By including all
networks in a given area, it allows micro-providers such
as local WiFi operators access to customers. By allowing
competition, it keeps costs low. The splitting of signaling
costs makes these costs transparent, while still retaining the
flexibility for service providers to provide a wide range of
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a framework for charging for QoS. However, for the PDE, its
main benefit is it provides a distributed, scalable method of
arranging connectivity over heterogeneous networks.
As well as providing a mechanism whereby the PDE can
negotiate for connectivity opportunistically on available access
technologies, the PDE allows a number of enhancements to
DMP operation. In the PDE, the DME monitors PAN connec-
tivity and the external networks devices to which the PAN can
connect. When initial contact is made with the DMP through
the LMC, a list of available networks can optionally be sent
to SPA with the connection request. While not so important
with ubiquitous coverage networks such as UMTS, this is a
useful feature to assist with local, discontinuous networks such
as WiFi hotspots. To enhance security, a two stage process is
proposed for bidding when the DMP is used with the PDE.
In the first stage, the SPA would invite expressions of interest
from NOAs who feel they would be in a position to offer
service. This first stage could be pre-arranged, so that certain
networks could say that they would always be interested in
provide service meeting certain characteristics. Only those
NOAs which respond positively, and which the SPA is willing
to negotiate [5] with (which will depend on whether the SPA
is willing to trust them, as discussed in the following section)
will be sent the full information about the service request to
allow them to respond with a price. Note that NOAs will not
know at this stage which other NOAs have been invited to
bid, although to avoid collusion, certain information is made
available by the MPA in a time delayed fashion so that the
different market actors can assure themselves of the correct
functioning of the market.
Registration and paging contracts work slightly differently
in the PDE context as well. Paging for a PDE sub-network will
be under the control of the local DME for that network, in that
the signaling information has to go to that entity. The paging
contract could be via any access technology which one of the
devices in that sub-network can receive, with that network
access device forwarding any page to the local DME. Since
the local DME is aware of the connection status of each device
in the sub-network, should the device which the registration
and paging contract is working through become disconnected,
either from the sub-network (i.e. the sub-network splits) or
from the access network, the local DME will be able to contact
the DMP through the LMC to arrange a new registration and
paging contract through another access network or device.
This allows registration and paging contracts to be let through
less robust, but potentially cheaper, networks such as WLAN,
whereas the original DMP proposal envisages high coverage
networks like UMTS being used for such contracts.
IV. TRUST OF FOREIGN DEVICES AND SERVICE
PROVIDERS
Central to the concept of context-aware service provision
is support for opportunistic communication. Within the PAN
that is the ability to interact with localised infrastructure over
short range wireless links in an ad hoc basis, but the DMP
extends this capability to the possibility of interacting with
access networks in a similar manner. This implies utilisation of
bearers and services supplied by providers that the user does
not have a long term subscription contract with, and hence
these suppliers can be regarded as foreign entities. It is only
after a degree of trust [6] has been established between the PN
and the foreign service/device that the service can be delivered
to he user.
In order to manage interaction with foreign entities a frame-
work for trust establishment is required such that the user’s
security requirements are not breached. Such frameworks are
by necessity complex. Several actors can be identified – the
user themselves, the corresponding party, the provider(s) of
the communication link and the provider of the content. The
providers of the link and content may be the same as the user
or corresponding node, depending on application. Within the
PN there will be devices which:
• The user owns and controls fully;
• The user owns but does not control fully;
• The user does not own but controls at least partially;
• Corresponding entities which the user may use or com-
municate with but over which he has no control (like a
foreign printer or display unit).
Since PNs are highly dynamic, with devices entering and
leaving, it is also necessary for devices to be able to specify the
trust they place in corresponding parties’ ability to undertake
agreements, both from their underlying capability and the
capability of the communications link, and as regards their
willingness of the device to perform as agreed. As can be
seen, a rich method of specifying trust policies is required.
Mobile VCE is developing a Trust Management Architec-
ture which allows the complex trust arrangements within the
PDE to be managed. An overview is given in Fig. 2. Three
domains are identified:
• PDE Domain: a zone that consists of devices and entities
owned and trusted by the PDE user.
• Service Domain: a zone whereby only trusted computing
environment, users, devices, applications, agents, data
sources are permitted to access when sufficient security
procedures/ mechanisms are performed.
• Other domain: an untrusted zone as perceived by a PDE
user. It consists the PDE networks of other users, 3rd
party devices, service providers, content providers, access
providers and transport providers.
Having separate domains allows different security policies
to be defined for different domains. The crucial element in
the framework is the “trust engine” between the PDE and the
Service domains. Different trust requirements can be identified
and classified in this region. The trust engine provides a formal
mechanism for expressing trust requirements and identifying
security constraints for the trust policy. The trust information
provided in the trust engine will vary over time.
Key inputs to the trust engine, shown to the left in Fig. 2,
are included in the trust specification: Trust Reputation, Risk
Assessment, Pre-assigned Trust Level, Performance Capabil-
ity, Trusting Period and Types of Access. In detail, these are:
• Trust Reputation In our architecture, Trust Reputation
(which is distinct from the DMP reputation), is based
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on eight cryptographic evaluators: Risk Assessment, the
amount of risk to other devices should the device not
be trustworthy; Recovery Rate from Attack, the ability
of a device to detect and repair itself from intrusion;
Cryptographic Processing, the ability of the device to
undertake cryptographic functions, such as Key Gener-
ation; Identification, the confidence that can be placed
on the device’s identity; Confidentiality, the ability of the
device to keep secrets; Non-interference, the ability of the
device to resist attack; Time Synchronisation, the ability
of the device to tell the time accurately (to resist replay
attacks, for example); and the Security of any Execution
Environment. If direct information is not available, the
reputation (or trust value) can still be based on indirect
observations or evidence from the auditing service and
the intrusion detection system. These trust evaluators are
necessary to guard against any indirect risk which could
be inherited should an honest and authenticated entity
become compromised.
• Pre-assigned Trust Level, defined by the user, where
flexibility is required in both the trust allocation and
mapping.
• Performance Capability, the ability to deliver the
promised services or tasks in the agreed manner.
• Trusting Period. Three different trusting periods are de-
fined: Pre-Trust, Mid-Trust and Post-Trust periods. Pre-
trust is defines the period before any interaction with the
device. Mid-trust is the period during which negotiation
is undertaken with the device, and Post-Trust is the
trust level after that negotiation, which would presumably
involve authentication and key exchange. Each level
requires that the entity satisfy the security rules set by
the previous trust periods before it can be granted any
additional rights from the new period.
• Security Status is the security level that an entity has
obtained.
• Types of Access is the types of required membership.
To set up a dynamic trust policy, we also require:
• Agreed Protocols and Message for exchanging informa-
tion on which trust decisions may be based.
• A mechanism of including any existing Security Pol-
icy/Services such as privacy policy and authorisation
function so that they can be re-used and integrated as
part of the new trust policy.
• Security Mechanisms such as digital signature and en-
cryption assure security functions (e.g. integrity & con-
fidentiality) to enforce various service qualities between
the end-users.
• Bindings Security to tie security characteristics from
the Security Mechanisms to the agreed Protocols and
Message.
• Security Token and Exchange Service to provide a set of
rules to the trust engine to create and exchange an entity’s
characteristics such as name, group and capability.
• Policy expression & exchange where an ideal policy lan-
guage is identified and is used to express the capabilities
or constraints of PDE security. It also facilitates service
requests and providers to exchange dynamically security
(and other) policy information in order to establish a
negotiated security context between them.
Unlike the OSGI’s Web Services (WS)-Trust Specifications
[7], the PDE’s trust architecture anticipates that a trusting
relationship should not be established by just using trusted
proxies. Evaluation of trust and interrelationships between the
outcome of the security execution and the access rights are
also vital to building a trusting relationship. If not, issues may
arise when a relationship is built with no clear understanding
on the referring or requiring trust component.
We have used a structured and widely adopted language,
eXtensible Markup Language (XML)[8], as our policy repre-
sentation and implementation. XML is increasingly used to
integrate applications and communicate between systems in
5many environments, and provides a good foundation for our
policy specification. Further details of the trust management
architecture and examples of policy specification can be found
in [9].
V. SECURITY CHALLENGES
The foregoing discussion on Trust Management does not
represent the totality of research into the security issues within
PN solutions, a wide variety of research is being conducted
into addressing the various threats that have been identified
thus far [10], attempting where possible to learn lessons from
the Grid Community [11].
When a device is first purchased by a user and is to be
inducted into his/her PN and initialisation procedure in needed.
An initialisation procedure is currently under investigation that
permits secure induction. Mutual authentication of the devices
that form the PN is another area of active research [12].
Communication between constituent devices is only permitted
after mutual device authentication.
The work area also examines the challenging issue of
Digital Rights Management (DRM). In particular how to
permits multiple devices belonging to a single user to share
and access copyrighted material yet prevent that material being
forwarded to third parties. Given that the PDE will exist at
several locations simultaneously due to its distributed nature,
there is a requirement to ensure that local blackout regions for
DxB-T technologies can still be maintained [13].
The need to provide the user with a degree of location
privacy is also addressed [14].
VI. AD HOC ROUTING STRATEGIES
The research programme considers 2 key ad hoc routing
problems: secure routing and QoS provision versus battery
power. With the former, a 2 Hop Acknowledged Routing
Protocol (2HARP) has been proposed to detect and avoid
non-cooperative nodes. These node include malicious nodes
or selfish node — nodes that do not forward packets in
order to conserve battery power. The latter is concerned
with MAC optimisation to minimise battery consumption by
synchronising node sleep cycles [15], [16]. The need for QoS
in ad hoc networks is also addressed [17].
VII. SUMMARY
There is a great deal of overlap between areas of research
with the Mobile VCE Personal Distributed Environment Work
Area and the MAGNET initiative. Areas of commonality
include
• An Automated algorithm to determine the most appropri-
ate node to act as the controller in an ad hoc networking
environment;
• The requirement for a Trust Architecture to mitigate
against attacks by foreign devices, whilst enabling com-
munication;
• Identification of the need for dynamic service negotiation
via a user agent;
• The need for secure ad hoc routing protocols to take
account of non-cooperative nodes.
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